




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Future Citizen 
@Slavetoprayer1



The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 



PREFACE
• 1992 (1994-1995) — First edition
• 2012 (2013-2014) — Second edition

Kristopher
"It may be dangerous to be America's
enemy, but to be America's friend is
even more dangerous." — Winston Churchill

It would have been a tragedy if the United States had not won the Cold War. The United States had to win the Cold War because the Soviet Union was a global superpower. The United States had to win the Cold War because the Soviet Union was a global superpower. The United States had to win the Cold War because the Soviet Union was a global superpower.

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ROMANIAN

1:21 AM · Jun 14, 2023 · 2,420 Views

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
Reply



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the end of the Cold War has brought us to the "the end of history."



Everything south of that is fair game. 7th gen warfare

Many in the West seem to believe that "perpetual peace" among the great powers is finally at hand. The end of the Cold War, so the argument goes, marked a sea change in how great powers interact with one another. We have entered a world in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competition, much less war, which has become an obsolescent enterprise. In the words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War has brought us to the "the end of history."¹

This perspective suggests that great powers no longer view each other as potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations, members of what is sometimes called the "international community." The prospects for cooperation are abundant in this promising new world, a world which is likely to bring increased prosperity and peace to all the great powers. Even a few adherents of realism, a school of thought that has historically held pessimistic views about the prospects for peace among the great powers, appear to have bought into the reigning optimism, as reflected in an article from the mid-1990s titled "Realists as Optimists."²

Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the

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"The possibility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hardly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared." This was written in 2001 mind you pre Israel lobby.

Hudson: "They fear Nuclear Holocaust!"

2 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

Generational Trauma

great powers was stillborn. Consider, for example, that even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and roughly the same number in Northeast Asia. It does so because it recognizes that dangerous rivalries would probably emerge among the major powers in these regions if U.S. troops were withdrawn. Moreover, almost every European state, including the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated, albeit muted, fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might behave aggressively; fear of Japan in Northeast Asia is probably even more profound, and it is certainly more frequently expressed. Finally, the possibility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hardly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared. 2001

NATIONALISM
How do we explain trade/diplomacy and...
* absolute gov vs relative gov

The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system. Minder of vassals

There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price.³ At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away.

unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition.

? vs. adversarial hegemon



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A Chinese plowing bull bucking the Yoke placed on its back by the great western powers was an inevitability.

4 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

China
Although it is depressing to realize that great powers might think and act this way, it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter's integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China's transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe. is Total Free Trade Enslavement

Presumpt.
Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China's power grows. *

OFFENSIVE REALISM

This book offers a realist theory of international politics that challenges the prevailing optimism about relations among the great powers. That enterprise involves three particular tasks.



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To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world. The candidate need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have some

The theory focuses on the great powers because these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics.⁵ The fortunes of all states—great powers and smaller powers alike—are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability. For example, politics in almost every region of the world were deeply influenced by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1990. The two world wars that preceded the Cold War had a similar effect on regional politics around the world. Each of these conflicts was a great-power rivalry, and each cast a long shadow over every part of the globe.

Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world.⁶ The candidate need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have some reasonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional forces. In the unlikely event that one state gained nuclear superiority over all of its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge.

Defn.
Great
Power's
Nuclear
Convent
forces
needed

Who would've thought conventional trench warfare would be back in style? Oh yeah The Russians did...



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reasonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war.”



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My assumption in regards as to why England didn't engage in hard imperialism (hot war) to dominate Europe is because they mastered soft power via labor arbitrage & the civic shaping of native populations into rootless cosmopolitanism.

6 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

My second task in this book is to show that the theory tells us a lot about the history of international politics. The ultimate test of any theory is how well it explains events in the real world, so I go to considerable lengths to test my arguments against the historical record. Specifically, the focus is on great-power relations from the start of the French

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1792 until the end of the twentieth century.⁷ Much attention is paid to the European great powers because they dominated world politics for most of the past two hundred years. Indeed, until Japan and the United States achieved great-power status in 1895 and 1898, respectively, Europe was home to all of the world's great powers. Nevertheless, the book also includes substantial discussion of the politics of Northeast Asia, especially regarding imperial Japan between 1895 and 1945 and China in the 1990s. The United States also figures prominently in my efforts to test offensive realism against past events.

Some of the important historical puzzles that I attempt to shed light on include the following:

- 1) What accounts for the three longest and bloodiest wars in modern history—the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815), World War I (1914–18), and World War II (1939–45)—conflicts that involved all of the major powers in the system?
- 2) What accounts for the long periods of relative peace in Europe between 1816 and 1852, 1871 and 1913, and especially 1945 and 1990, during the Cold War? *Because They Mastered*
- 3) Why did the United Kingdom, which was by far the wealthiest state in the world during the mid-nineteenth century, not build a powerful military and try to dominate Europe? In other words, why did it behave differently from Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, all of which translated their economic might into military might and strove for European hegemony? *DIPLOMATIC SOFT POWER*
- 4) Why was Bismarckian Germany (1862–90) especially aggressive between 1862 and 1870, fighting two wars with other great powers? *They conquer the Culture through Labour Arbitrage*



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Replying to @Slavetoprayer1

The island kingdom borrowed from every country of the Continent its skill in special branches of industry, and planted them on English soil, under the protection of her customs system.



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...

Interesting questions that he hopes to answer 🤔

Introduction 7

- and one war with a minor power, but hardly aggressive at all from 1871 until 1890, when it fought no wars and generally sought to maintain the European status quo? *TO END NATIONALISM?*
- 5) Why did the United Kingdom, France, and Russia form a balancing coalition against Wilhelmine Germany before World War I, but fail to organize an effective alliance to contain Nazi Germany?
 - 6) Why did Japan and the states of Western Europe join forces with the United States against the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War, even though the United States emerged from World War II with the most powerful economy in the world and a nuclear monopoly? *SKIN SUITS*
AMERICA THOROUGHLY INHABITED THEM
 - 7) What explains the commitment of American troops to Europe and Northeast Asia during the twentieth century? For example, why did the United States wait until April 1917 to join World War I, rather than enter the war when it broke out in August 1914? For that matter, why did the United States not send troops to Europe before 1914 to prevent the outbreak of war? Similarly, why did the United States not balance against Nazi Germany in the 1930s or send troops to Europe before September 1939 to prevent the

... of arms control in Europe before September 1939 to prevent the outbreak of World War II?

8) Why did the United States and the Soviet Union continue building up their nuclear arsenals after each had acquired a secure second-strike capability against the other? A world in which both sides have an "assured destruction" capability is generally considered to be stable and its nuclear balance difficult to overturn, yet both superpowers spent billions of dollars and rubles trying to gain a first-strike advantage.

*Jews
war mongering Paranoia*

Third, I use the theory to make predictions about great-power politics in the twenty-first century. This effort may strike some readers as foolhardy, because the study of international relations, like the other social sciences, rests on a shakier theoretical foundation than that of the natural sciences. Moreover, political phenomena are highly complex; hence, precise political predictions are impossible without theoretical tools that are superior to



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"our security is tied to the stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and working with others, not working against them... With the end of the cold war, it has become possible to construct a Europe that is increasingly united by a shared commitment

comprehend their surroundings. Some are aware of it and some are not, some admit it and some do not; but there is no escaping the fact that we could not make sense of the complex world around us without simplifying theories. The Clinton administration's foreign policy rhetoric, for example, was heavily informed by the three main liberal theories of international relations: 1) the claim that prosperous and economically interdependent states are unlikely to fight each other, 2) the claim that democracies do not fight each other, and 3) the claim that international institutions enable states to avoid war and concentrate instead on building cooperative relationships.

** Clinton Admin's Theory of I.R*

DIVERSE SOFT-POWER MEID

Consider how Clinton and company justified expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-1990s. President Clinton maintained that one of the chief goals of expansion was "locking in democracy's gains in Central Europe," because "democracies resolve their differences peacefully." He also argued that the United States should foster an "open trading system," because "our security is tied to the stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and working with others, not working against them."⁹ Strobe Talbott, Clinton's Oxford classmate and deputy secretary of state, made the same claims for NATO enlargement: "With the end of the cold war, it has become possible to construct a Europe that is increasingly united by a shared commitment to open societies and open markets." Moving the borders of NATO eastward, he maintained, would help "to solidify the national consensus for democratic and market reforms" that already existed in states like Hungary and Poland and thus enhance the prospects for peace in the region.¹⁰

1) Dem Theory 2) Free Market Theory 3) Int Cooperation Theory

ENTREPRENEURIAL MISSION

In the same spirit, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright praised NATO's founders by saying that "[t]heir basic achievement was to begin the construction of the . . . network of rule-based institutions and arrangements that keep the peace." "But that achievement is not complete," she warned, and "our challenge today is to finish the post-war construction project . . . [and] expand the area of the world in which American interests and values will thrive."¹¹

RB10

These examples demonstrate that general theories about how the world works play an important role in how policymakers identify the ends



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to open societies and open markets." Moving the borders of NATO eastward, he maintained, would help "to solidify the national consensus for democratic and market reforms" their basic achievement was to begin the construction of the network of rule-based institutions" RBIO



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
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Other seminal realist works worth skimming



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Where the realists diverge from one another.




All three of these realist giants critique some aspect of liberalism in their writings. For example, both Carr and Waltz take issue with the liberal claim that economic interdependence enhances the prospects for peace.¹⁷ More generally, Carr and Morgenthau frequently criticize liberals for holding utopian views of politics which, if followed, would lead states

3 ↺ ♡ 6 📊 278 ↗



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maintenance of a liberal economic order that allows for free economic exchange among states. Such an order makes states more prosperous, thereby bolstering peace, because prosperous states are more economically satisfied and satisfied states are more peaceful... a world without war



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These rules are not imposed on states by some leviathan, but are negotiated by states, which agree to abide by the rules they created because it is in their interest to do so. institutions or rules can fundamentally change state behavior.

~~State~~ **IMPOSED** Multi/mini lateral COOPs
 to support for the cause of the whole

Introduction 17

Finally, some liberals maintain that international institutions enhance the prospects for cooperation among states and thus significantly reduce the likelihood of war.²⁵ Institutions are not independent political entities that sit above states and force them to behave in acceptable ways. Instead, institutions are sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. These rules are not imposed on states by some leviathan, but are negotiated by states, which agree to abide by the rules they created because it is in their interest to do so. Liberals claim that these institutions or rules can fundamentally change state behavior. Institutions, so the argument goes, can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how their every move affects their relative power position, and thus they push states away from war and promote peace.

cooperate Dist.

A NETWORK OF NATIONS
A Diverse Democracy

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Institutions, so the argument goes, can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how their every move affects their relative power position, and thus they push states away tom war and promote peace.

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Realists focus mainly on great powers because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment



Realism

In contrast to liberals, realists are pessimists when it comes to international politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. Creating a peaceful world is surely an attractive idea, but it is not a practical one. "Realism," as Carr notes, "tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies."²⁶

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars. Second, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions between "good" and "bad" states.

Nationalism



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
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"The structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies."



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"In the future world the misuse of power as implied in the term 'power politics' must not be the controlling factor in international relations." FDR
"in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute" Clinton

The screenshot shows a document page with the following text:

Introduction 23

War. Most people prefer to think of fights between their own state and rival states as clashes between good and evil, where they are on the side of the angels and their opponents are aligned with the devil. Thus, leaders tend to portray war as a moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power. Realism is a hard sell.

Americans appear to have an especially intense antipathy toward balance-of-power thinking. The rhetoric of twentieth-century presidents, for example, is filled with examples of realism bashing. Woodrow Wilson is probably the most well-known example of this tendency, because of his eloquent campaign against balance-of-power politics during and immediately after World War I.⁵⁰ Yet Wilson is hardly unique, and his successors have frequently echoed his views. In the final year of World War II, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, "In the future world the misuse of power as implied in the term 'power politics' must not be the controlling factor in international relations."⁵¹ More recently, Bill Clinton offered a strikingly similar view, proclaiming that "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era."⁵² He sounded the same theme when defending NATO expansion in 1997, arguing that the charge that this policy might isolate Russia was based on the mistaken belief "that the great power territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 21st century." Instead, Clinton emphasized his belief that "enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways ... and will compel us to cooperate."⁵³

Handwritten note: enlightened

The complex block also contains two images: a black and white photo of Franklin D. Roosevelt sitting at a desk, and a color photo of Bill Clinton speaking at a podium with a microphone.

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"It is ill suited to a new era... enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways ... and will compel us to cooperate." - Bill Clinton


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"Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism."



Speculating Speculators

Wealth and Power 77

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Key graphs of relative European “wealth”

	1830	1860	1880	1900	1913
GNP (billions of dollars)					
United Kingdom	8.2	16.1	23.6	36.3	44.1
Russia	10.6	14.4	23.3	32.0	52.4
Relative share of European wealth (percent)					
United Kingdom	53	68	59	37	28
Russia	15	4	3	10	11
Energy consumption (millions of metric tons of coal equivalent)					
United Kingdom	—	73.8	125.3	171.4	195.3
Russia	—	1.0	5.4	30.4	54.5
Iron/steel production (thousands of tons)					
United Kingdom	690	3,880	7,870	6,979	7,787
Russia	190	350	450	2,201	4,925
Relative share of world manufacturing output (percent)					
United Kingdom	9.5	19.9	22.9	18.5	13.6
Russia	5.6	7.0	7.6	8.8	8.2
Total industrial potential (United Kingdom in 1900 = 100)					
United Kingdom	17.5	45.0	73.3	100.0	127.2
Russia	10.3	15.8	24.5	47.5	76.6
Population (millions)					
United Kingdom	23.8	28.8	34.6	41.2	45.6
Russia	57.6	76.0	100.0	135.7	175.1

SOURCES: GNP figures, which are in 1960 U.S. dollars and prices, are from Paul Batouck, "Europe's Gross National Product: 1800-1975," *Journal of European Economic History* 5, No. 2 (Fall 1976), p. 281. Relative shares of world manufacturing output are from Paul Batouck, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1984," *Journal of European Economic History* 11, No. 2 (Fall 1982), p. 296. Figures for total industrial potential, which assign the United Kingdom in 1900 the baseline number of 100, are from *ibid.*, p. 292. The energy consumption figures, the iron/steel production figures, and the population figures are from J. David Singer and Martin Small, *National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1983* (Gene ADP-36; Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, February 1993). The figures for the relative shares of European wealth are from Table 3.1.

	1830	1860	1880	1900	1913
GDP (billions of dollars)					
United Kingdom	41	113	153	213	251
Russia	72	122	204	254	354
Relative share of European wealth (percent)					
United Kingdom	36	48	43	41	32
Russia	12	4	3	10	11
Energy consumption (millions of metric tons of coal equivalent)					
United Kingdom	—	73.8	125.3	171.4	195.3
Russia	—	1.0	5.4	30.4	54.5
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SOURCES: All data are from Singer and Small, *National Material Capabilities Data*.

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The red army was able to mobilize their wartime economy to out produce Germany.


80 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

Despite Germany's profound advantage in latent power, the Soviet war economy amazingly outproduced the German war economy over the course of the war and helped shift the balance of power in the Red Army's favor. As described earlier, the Soviet Union produced 2.2 times as many tanks as Germany and 1.3 times as many airplanes between 1941 and 1945. What is most astonishing is that the Soviets even outproduced the Germans in the early years of the war, when German control of Soviet territory was at its peak and the Allied bombing campaign was having barely any effect on the German war economy. The Soviet Union, for example, produced 24,446 tanks in 1942; Germany produced 9,200. The ratio of artillery pieces for 1942 was 127,000 to 12,000 in the Soviets' favor.⁶⁸ This asymmetry in weapons production eventually led to a significant Soviet advantage in the balance of ground forces. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets had a slight advantage in number of divisions—211:199—the key indicator of military strength. By January 1945, however, there were 473 Soviet divisions and only 276 German divisions, and the average Red Army division was far better equipped with weapons and vehicles than the average Wehrmacht division.⁶⁹

How did the Soviet Union manage to produce so much more weaponry than a far wealthier Nazi Germany? One possible answer is that the Soviet Union spent a larger percentage of its available wealth on the military than did the Third Reich. But in fact Germany devoted a slightly larger percentage of its national income to defense than did the Soviet Union. The German advantage in defense spending over the Soviets in 1942, for example, was 63 to 61 percent; in 1943 it was 70 to 61 percent.⁷⁰ The Allies' strategic bombing campaign might well have hurt German war pro-

duction in the last months of the war, but as noted above, the Soviet Union was turning out greater numbers of weapons than Germany long before the bombing campaign began to have any significant effect on German output. The Soviet effort was also helped by the U.S. Lend-Lease program, although that aid accounts for only a small percentage of Soviet output.⁷³ The main reason that the Soviet Union produced so many more weapons than Germany is that the Soviets did a much better job of rationalizing their economy to meet the demands of total war. In particular, the

Soviet (and American) economy was far better organized than the German economy for mass producing weaponry.⁷⁴



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“For sound strategic reasons, states build different kinds of military establishments, and they expend different amounts of their wealth on their fighting forces. Moreover, states distill military power from wealth at varying levels of efficiency.”

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said to a British visitor in 1911, “Excuse my saying so, but the few divisions you could put into the field could make no appreciable difference.”⁷⁴ In short, the United Kingdom was not as powerful as either France or Germany during the forty-four years before World War I, even though it was wealthier than France for that entire period, and wealthier than Germany for roughly three-quarters of that time (see Table 3.3).

It should be apparent that there are sometimes important differences in how wealth and power are distributed among the great powers, but that those incongruities are not caused by states passing up opportunities to maximize their share of world power. For sound strategic reasons, states build different kinds of military establishments, and they expend different amounts of their wealth on their fighting forces. Moreover, states distill military power from wealth at varying levels of efficiency. All of these considerations affect the balance of power.

Thus, although wealth is the foundation of military might, it is impossible to simply equate wealth with military might. It is necessary to come up with separate indicators of military power; the next chapter takes on this task.

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the most powerful states possess the most formidable armies. measuring the balance of land power by itself should provide a rough but sound indicator of the relative might of rival great powers. large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces

4

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The Primacy of Land Power

Power in international politics is largely a product of the military forces that a state possesses. Great powers, however, can acquire different kinds of fighting forces, and how much of each kind they buy has important implications for the balance of power. This chapter analyzes the four types of military power among which states choose—independent sea power, strategic airpower, land power, and nuclear weapons—to determine how to weigh them against each other and come up with a useful measure of power.

I make two main points in the discussion below. First, land power is the dominant form of military power in the modern world. A state's power is largely embedded in its army and the air and naval forces that support those ground forces. Simply put, the most powerful states possess the most formidable armies. Therefore, measuring the balance of land power by itself should provide a rough but sound indicator of the relative might of rival great powers.

Second, large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces. When opposing armies must cross a large expanse of water such as the Atlantic Ocean or the English Channel to attack each other, neither army is likely to have much offensive capability against its rival, regardless of the size and quality of the opposing armies.

Anglo-America shares the same geographical power projection deterrence

